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Do WE WANT A WEALTH TAX IN AMERICA?
BARRY L. ISAACS*
The author examines the arguments for and against a tax on
individual's wealth, and coneludeq that the economic and admin-
istrative detriments of such a tax would outweigh the benefits.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of instituting a wealth' tax in America, whereby an
annual tax is imposed on the entire value of an individual's assets
less his liabilities, has hitherto received little serious discussion in
this country.' This neglect may be changing, however, particularly
in the light of its adoption in such diverse countries as Switzerland,
India, Sweden, Columbia, Ceylon, Pakistan, Japan,3 Germany,
Denmark, and Luxembourg.4 In addition, the present governments
of England and France have also expressed considerable interest in
the idea, with the expectation that such a tax will be introduced
quite soon.'
* Member of the Illinois and Missouri Bars.
1. "Everyone has a notion, sufficiently correct for common purposes, of what is meant
by wealth." J.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1 (7th ed. 1871). "We really, and
justly, look upon a person as possessing the advantage of wealth, not in proportion to the
useful and agreeable things of which he is in the actual enjoyment, but to his command over
the general fund of things useful and agreeable; the power he possesses of providing for any
exigency, or obtaining any object of desire." Id. at 4.
2. W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 366 (1947). See also R. GOODE, THE
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 11-57 (rev. ed. 1976).
3. Japan adopted a net wealth tax in 1950 but repealed it in 1953. Tanabe, The Taxation
of Net Wealth, 14 INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 124.
4. Id.
5. See Wealth Tax, Cmnd. No. 5704 (1974); Select Committee on a Wealth Tax, Session
1974-75, H.C. JOUR. 696, I to IV (Nov. 1975); Prest, The Select Committee on a Wealth Tax,
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The 1976 primary race in New York for the Democratic nomina-
tion for the United States Senate saw, perhaps for the first time, a
prominent American seeking high office making an explicit issue of
the present distribution of wealth in America and advocating the
introduction of a net worth or wealth tax. Ramsey Clark, former
Attorney General of the United States during the Johnson adminis-
tration, charged that the present tax structure facilitates the
"economic royalism" of the very rich at the expense of the lower and
middle income groups. He declared that "economic justice" re-
quired the leveling of America's wealthiest families through taxa-
tion so that the vast economic power of this group would be pre-
vented from perpetuating itself from generation to generation.'
Clark was narrowly defeated for the Democratic nomination for the
Senate, and thus, for the moment at least, public discourse on this
issue on a national level has subsided.
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the Clark proposal
and to examine critically the various issues which would necessarily
arise by the adoption of any such recommendation. It will be as-
sumed for the purpose of this discussion that, given the unlikelihood
that our present tax system would ever be replaced in toto by any
other tax system (whether a wealth tax, expenditure tax,7 accession
tax,8 or whatever) analysis should be limited to the possibility of
adopting a wealth tax scheme in addition to our present estate, gift,
and income tax structure.'
II. THE CLARK PROPOSAL
The rationale for a wealth tax is based on the judgment that
our estate and gift tax laws have wholly failed in their purpose
insofar as they have been unable to reduce or even check extraordi-
nary concentrations of wealth. It is asserted that .5% of all Ameri-
cans from 1953 to the present have consistently owned between 20%
and 22% of all the nation's privately held assets,"° and that even if
1976 BAIT. TAX. REV. 7; Barron's Nov. 1, 1976 at 4. The Barron's article indicates that some
of the ardour for the wealth tax may now be waning in both countries. It is also noted that
among the eight European countries that have a wealth tax, only Sweden and Denmark have
a capital gains tax.
6. Ramsey Clark/Senate '76, Position Papers 1-2 (1976) (on file with the University of
Miami Law Review).
7. See N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX passim (1955).
8. See MacDonald, From Estate Duty to Inheritance Tax-Towards an Income Tax on
Capital?, BRaIT. TAX REv. 306 (1973).
9. R. GOODE, supra note 2.
10. An examination of the statistical data will be undertaken later.
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generation-skipping trusts were taxed," the very largest estates
would still not be broken up. Thus it is urged that a small annual
tax (approximately three percent) be levied on that portion of
"family"'" wealth which is in excess of one million dollars. Since
there are 194,000 millionaires in this country with a collective net
worth of $516 billion, Clark estimates that such a 3% tax would yield
the Treasury $11 billion annually, a sum which he says could be
used to help reduce "crushing tax burdens" on the lower and middle
income citizens as well as to stimulate the creation of small estates
among a wider range of the citizenry. Provided that the new tax law
is written in such a way as to prevent tax avoidance through trusts
and other such devices, he asserts that it should all work out quite
simply and satisfactorily. It is assumed throughout that a large
redistribution of wealth in this country is both desirable and equita-
ble.
Numerous important questions relating to the tax are left unan-
swered. These questions include whether the tax itself would be
constitutional; whether the rate of tax would be fixed or progressive;
whether corporations and unincorporated associations would be di-
rectly taxed; whether certain individuals, for example, farmers,
would receive special treatment; whether any assets would be ex-
empt from tax; how and when assets would be valued; whether the
tax would be self-assessed like the income tax; and whether there
would be any fixed maximum aggregate liability with respect to
income and wealth taxes combined. Presumably these details would
have been worked out had the election gone the other way.'3
III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A WEALTH TAX
Whether or not it would be constitutional for Congress to im-
pose a tax on an individual solely on the basis of his net worth
depends upon the interpretation given to certain clauses in the
United States Constitution from which all federal taxing authority
is derived.
These clauses are:
(1) Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this
Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be de-
ll. Congress has recently amended the Internal Revenue Code to do precisely that.
I.R.C. §§ 2601-03.
12. For purposes of wealth tax, it is not entirely clear whether husband, wife, and chil-
dren are to be treated as one unit, or whether they are to be treated as separately assessable
persons, notwithstanding the use of such terms as "millionaire families."
13. Ramsey Clark/Senate '76, Position Papers 1-2 (1976).
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termined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, includ-
ing those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons. 4
(2) The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but
all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States."
(3) No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed
to be taken."
(4) No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State."'
(5) The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States and without regard to any census or
enumeration. 8
Looking only at the language of the Constitution it would seem
fair to conclude that, provided a tax is not deemed a "direct" one,
it will be constitutionally valid." Unfortunately, the concept of
"direct tax" is fraught with uncertainty." During the Constitutional
Convention, the precise meaning of "direct taxation" was an issue
which was left unresolved.2' Alexander Hamilton argued for the
United States in Hylton v. United States22 that a tax on public
carriages was not a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, and stated in his brief that no general principle could be found
14. U.S.CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. Since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment, this
article is now modified to include among those taxed within each state, every person except-
ing only Indians.
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5.
18. U. S. CONST. amend. XVI.
19. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601
(1895), the Supreme Court held that a federal tax on income derived from real estate was a
direct tax and therefore unconstitutional because it was not apportioned among the states
according to population. The sixteenth amendment specifically nullified the holding in
Pollock to the extent that "income" from any source could thenceforth be taxed without
apportionment. Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916). Later cases made it
clear, however, that the sixteenth amendment is to be taken as written, just as any other law
authorizing the imposition of taxes might, but that it "is not to be extended beyond the
meaning clearly indicated by the language used." Edwards v. Cuba R.R., 268 U.S. 628, 631
(1925). See also Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co., 271 U.S. 170, 174 (1926); Stanton v. Baltic
Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103, 112 (1916).
20. For an excellent history of the origin, meaning and purpose of the "direct tax" clause,
as well as the resulting confusion, see E. SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX 531-89 (2d ed. 1914).
21. 5 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 451 (2d ed. 1836), quoted in E. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 568.
22. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
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which would distinguish "direct" taxes from any other ones. He
insisted nevertheless that in order to give meaning to the Constitu-
tional phrase, some arbitrary distinction was required. Thus, he
concluded that certain taxes were presumed to be the only direct
taxes: poll taxes on land, buildings, and general assessments,
whether on their whole real or personal estate; all other taxes would
of necessity be deemed indirect. 3 Hamilton's arguments prevailed
insofar as the Court held that a tax on carriages was not a direct
one, but the justices were not clear about what would constitute a
direct tax. Justice Chase was inclined to think that only a poll
tax and a tax on land would be direct."4 Justice Patterson suggested
that while the principal objects of the framers might have been the
poll tax and the tax on land, they were not their only ones. Justice
Iredell felt that a direct tax had to be a tax on something insepara-
bly attached to land.2" All the justices agreed, however, that despite
their uncertainty about how to classify any given tax, the Constitu-
tion did not contemplate any tax as a direct one except those which
Congress could reasonably have subjected to the apportionment
requirement. They agreed further that since a carriage tax could
never be reasonably apportioned, Congress could never have in-
tended apportionment, and the Constitution would not require it.,
In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,28 decided some one
hundred years after Hylton, the Court did not advert to the prior
understanding about how to test whether or not the apportionment
rule might apply; namely, that one looks to the thing to be taxed
to decide if Congress could reasonably have wanted the tax appor-
tioned. Rather, the court decided that an income tax on real estate
23. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 572.
24. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175.
25. Id. at 177.
26. Id. at 183.
27. The difficulty of apportioning the carriage tax among the states according to popula-
tion was illustrated by Justice Chase:
Suppose two States, equal in census, to pay 80,000 dollars each, by a tax on
carriages, of 8 dollars on every carriage; and in one State there are 100 carriages,
and in the other 1,000. The owners of carriages in one State would pay ten times
the tax of owners in the other. A. in one State would pay for his carriage 8 dollars,
but B. in the other state, would pay for his carriage, 80 dollars.
Id. at 174. He concluded that: "If it is proposed to tax any specific article by the rule of
apportionment, and it would evidently create great inequality and injustice, it is unreasona-
ble to say, that the Constitution intended such tax should be laid by that rule. "Id. at 174.
It should be clear from this example that given the enormous disparity between the numbers
of citizens in each state and their per capita wealth respectively, a wealth tax similar to the
Clark proposal or any wealth tax proposal for that matter would be extremely inequitable
and, therefore, impossible to impose realistically.
28. 157 U.S. 429, 570-72, on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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required apportionment because it was, in reality, a tax on the land
itself. The Court merely referred to the earlier Hylton case as having
expressed no clear definition of what would constitute a direct tax
except that it certainly included a tax on land, and that it did not
provide any real guidance on the question before the Court."9 In-
deed, the Pollock Court was unequivocally certain as to the reason
for the inclusion of the constitutional clauses themselves: the
framers simply wanted to prevent the citizens from any state
from being taxed by a majority of citizens from the other states
by means of a general federal levy.30 It was, as Chief Justice Fuller
put it, "one of the great compromises of the Constitution, resting
on the doctrine that the right of representation ought to be con-
ceded to every community on which a tax is to be imposed, but
crystallizing it in such forms as to allay jealousies in respect of the
future balance of power ....
This historical interpretation has been subjected to scathing
attack and is undoubtedly in error.32 Far from having had anything
to do with interstate rivalries, the direct tax clauses were inserted
to induce the slave states to accept representation in the House of
Representatives based on the three-fifths rule. With the disappear-
ance of slavery and adoption of the fourteenth amendment, the
reason for the clauses disappeared.33
The first Pollock case expressly declared that the definition of
the term "direct taxes" was ultimately a question of constitutional
interpretation and not one of economics .3 It is true that the burden
of proof would be on the taxpayer to show that a net worth tax was
invalid under the Constitution unless apportioned, and that it did
not fall within the scope of the sixteenth amendment (which lifted
the apportionment requirement from those income taxes deemed
direct).35 It is also true that from the earliest days of the Republic,
29. Id. at 570-72.
30. Id. at 582, 587; 158 U.S. at 620-21. Justice Fuller even declared, surprisingly, that
"the distinction between direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the framers of
the Constitution and those who adopted it." 157 U.S. at 573.
31. 157 U.S. at 563.
32. See E. SELIGMAN, supra note 20.
33. E. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 557-59. It has been suggested that the link between
representative and direct taxation is clearly apparent in the Constitution, both in art. I, § 2,
cl. 3, which sets the two together, and art. V, which prevented, until 1808, any alteration of
either the direct tax clause or the clause forbidding any federal interference with state migra-
tion laws, both of which are set forth in art. I, § 9. B. BITKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME
ESTATE AND GIFr TAXATION 6 n.5 (4th ed. 1972).
34. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 558, (1895). See also Knowlton
v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 82 (1900).
35. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1962); 1 MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 4.08 (1959).
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a tax upon the exercise of only some of the rights adhering to owner-
ship, such as upon the use of property8 or its transfer, has been
considered an indirect tax and, therefore, not subject to the appor-
tionment requirement." But there can be little doubt that a tax
upon a privilege connected with property will be declared a property
tax, and thereby, a direct tax, if the privilege is absolutely indispen-
sable to any effective enjoyment of ownership. 8
Thus, subsequent cases which have delved into the esoteric
Constitutional language involved in Pollock, have construed it to
mean that an unapportioned tax levied upon the ownership of real
or personal property is unconstitutional. 9 Moreover, the influence
of Pollock was decisive in allowing the Court in 1920, in Eisner v.
Macumber,40 to reach the conclusion that a stock dividend could not
be taxed as income to the stockholder because the stock represented
36. In Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399 (1913), the constitutionality of
a federal statute which purported to treat the proceeds of ore mined by a corporation upon
its own premises as "income" for the limited purpose of imposing an excise tax on the carrying
on of business in a corporate capacity measured by the net annual income, was upheld as an
indirect tax on the property, and therefore valid, without the need for apportionment accord-
ing to population as would have been required by the Constitution if it had been found to be
a direct tax. The Court gave short shrift to the argument that mining is, in reality, not a
business, but a mere conversion of the capital represented by the real estate into capital
represented by cash. While recognizing the peculiar nature of mining property, the Court
stated that under no reasonable stretch of the imagination could it be asserted, either practi-
cally or theoretically, that a mining company was not "doing business" within the meaning
of the statute, since it could not be seriously contended that the ores were not worth more at
the surface than in the ground, plus the cost of the operation itself. Id. at 414-16. The Court
declared that Congress, in exercising its prerogative to tax a legitimate subject of taxation,
was not prevented from measuring the taxation by the total income although it was derived
in part from property which considered by itself was not taxable. Id. at 416-17 (citing Flint
v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 165 (1911)). As to petitioner's final contention that the
depreciation of a mining property attributable to the extraction of the ore is co-extensive with
the ore in place before it was mined, the Court said that the practical effect of such a notion
would deny the reality of the yield resulting from the mining which exceeds the cost of
property or the cost of developing it. Furthermore, the court stated:
assuming the depletion of the mineral stock is an element to be considered in
determining the reasonable depreciation that is to be treated as a loss in the
ascertainment of the net income . . . , we deem it quite inadmissible to estimate
such depletion as if it had been done by a trespasser, to whom all profit is denied.
Id. at 420-21. Since the mining company did not charge any amount for depreciation on its
books and since the Court was limited by the method employed in the agreed statement of
facts, it declined to decide what a reasonable allowance for depreciation of the mining prop-
erty might have been. Id. at 422-23.
37. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1962).
38. Note, 39 HARV. L. REv. 888, 889 (1926).
39. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S.
107, 162 (1911); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 80-81 (1900); Simmons v. United States,
308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1962). But see New York ex rel. Cohen v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308,
315 (1937).
40. 252 U.S. 189 (1920); see I.R.C. § 305.
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a capital asset which merely increased the value of the capital in-
vestment. Such increase in the value of the property could not be
taxed without apportionment as required by article I, section 2,
clause 3, and section 9, clause 4, without a sale or other disposition.'
Endemic to any wealth tax is the notion that the property owner
need not realize any material gain by his use of the property in order
for the tax to be levied.
Even if the holding in the Eisner case should be or could be
overturned," the problem of taxing capital on the basis of ownership
without apportionment does not disappear. While there has never
been such a holding, there may be grounds to suppose that even if
a wealth tax could overcome the direct tax and realization obstacles,
it might still be "so repugnant to fundamental principles of equality
and justice that the law should be held to be void, even although it
transgresses no express limitation in the Constitution."43 This would
be the case particularly where a taxing statute was so capricious as
to be tantamount to a confiscation." It is not implausible that a
wealth tax would be held eo ipso confiscatory since confiscation is
one of the avowed purposes of such a tax.45 On the whole, therefore,
the case law and the commentators46 are in general agreement that
the constitutionality of a wealth tax would be doubtful.47
41. In Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 378-80 (1934), the Court
stated that any statute which required, without apportionment, the owner of a building to
include in gross income the imputed rental value of the space therein, whether occupied by
the owner or not, could not be sustained. Furthermore, neither use nor nonuse of the building
constitute income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment.
42. See Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 409 (1943) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900). In upholding the federal inheritance tax
of 1908, Justice White, speaking for the majority, expressed the view that:
If a case should ever arise, where an arbitrary and confiscatory exaction is im-
posed bearing the guise of a progressive or any other form of tax, it will be time
enough to consider whether the judicial power can afford a remedy by applying
inherent and fundamental principles for the protection of the individual, even
though there be no express authority in the Constitution to do so.
Id. at 109-10.
44. MERTENS, supra note 30, at § 4.09 (citing Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932);
Nichols v. Collidge, 27 U.S. 531 (1927)).
45. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 410 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
46. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 13; W. VICKERY, supra note 2, at 12.
47. Seligman, whose history of income taxation first appeared 65 years ago, concluded
as follows:
It would naturally occur to an unbiased observer that the simplest way out of the
difficulty would be entirely to eliminate from the constitution the clause or
clauses referring to direct taxes. . . .We must not forget that as long as the words
"direct taxation" are retained in the Constitution, similar difficulties will arise
in the future, even if the income tax matter is disposed of. Hamilton's prophecy
that we shall be at a loss to find any disposition of the matter which can satisfac-
[Vol. 32:23
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IV. WEALTH AND THE WEALTHY: SOME STATISTICS
Economics, properly understood, is the study of the ways in
which scarce resources can be allocated and the concomitant effects
of employing any particular means of resource allocation. It does not
offer an answer to the question: "What constitutes a just distribu-
tion of wealth?" To find that answer, we must necessarily enter the
realm of value judgments and individual preferences. It is not neces-
sary, however, to make such judgments if our inquiry is limited
merely to the actual distribution of wealth; all we need then is
accurate data.
As mentioned earlier, the Clark proposal suggested that be-
tween 20% and 22% of all privately held assets have been in the
hands of .5% of the American people since at least 1953. Such fig-
ures are widely regarded as accurate 8 because they are calculated
according to a technique employed by Robert J. Lampman called
the estate multiplier method.'9 This method has been described as
follows:
[Als currently used [it) rests on the assumption that death
draws a random sample, stratified by age and sex, of the living
population. If one has available age-sex-specific mortality rates,
an estimate of the wealth of the living in a given period of time
can be made by stepping-up the wealth of decedents in each age-
sex class by the inverse of the mortality rates associated with that
age-sex class, andsumming the results across all age-sex classes.50
Lampman's estimates show that the greatest concentration of
wealth held by the top .5% of all persons reached its peak in 1929
when such net worth represented 32.4% of the total. Thereafter it
declined almost steadily until by 1949 the net worth figure had
dropped to 19.3% of the total. According to calculations made by
others for 1953, 1958, 1962, 1965, and 1969, 51 the figures show almost
torily determine the point has not only come true but will remain true in the
future.
E. SELIGMAN, supra note 20, at 594.
48. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 266; A. TArr, THE TAXATION OF PERSONAL WEALTH 4-6
(1967). The Internal Revenue Service estimated the number of U.S. millionaires in 1969 at
121,000. IRS, Statistics of Income-1969 PERSONAL WEALTH 19 (1973), cited in R. GOODE,
supra note 2, at 268 n.41.
49. See R.J. LAMPMAN, THE SHARE OF Top WEALTH-HOLDERS IN NATIONAL WEALTH 1922-
56 (1962). The technique is not new. For a history of its use see Smith & Calvert, Estimating
the Wealth of Top Wealth-Holders from Estate-Tax Returns, AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIA-
TION PROCEEDINGS OF THE BusINEss AND ECONOMIC SECTION 249-50 (1965).
50. Smith & Calvert, supra note 49, at 248.
51. Smith & Franklin, The Concentration of Personal Wealth, 64 AMER. EcoN. REv. 162,
166 (1974).
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no change.5" Thus according to Lampman, Clark is correct.
The problem with these figures is that all estimates based upon
the estate multiplier method have inherent deficiencies. Such defi-
ciencies, while known to those who do the calculating, are unknown
or at least unmentioned by those who would make use of them. For
example, in the United States the minimum gross estate size requir-
ing filing a return is high;53 therefore, the data is not at all suited to
estimate total private wealth or its distribution along a complete
Lorenz curve.5 In addition, the sampling errors are the greatest
where the estimates are based on small numbers of estates and in
the youngest age groups.5 The following provides a stunning illus-
tration of how wealth estimates for younger persons can become
completely exaggerated because relatively few of their number die
at an early age. Using Internal Revenue printouts for 1958, one
female under forty died with a recorded estate of $14,526,000,
$13,609,000 of which was in annuities. Utilizing the high multiplier
corresponding to females under forty, an estimate of annuities held
by that grouping was valued at $19.8 billion, certainly an incorrect
assessnient5 5
Other technical problems include guessing about the distribu-
tion of wealth among the lower ranges of wealth ownership, failure
of a significant number of returns to include any age information,
considerable sampling error involving very large estates as to types
52. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 266, table 10-4.
53. Only gross estates in excess of $60,000 are required to file an estate tax return. After
December 31, 1976, only gross estates which exceed $120,000 must file, but by 1981 that figure
will have increased to $175,000. Tax Reform Act of 1976, 26 U.S.C. §§ 2001(a)&(c), 2010,
6018(a).
54. Smith & Calvert, supra note 49, at 248. "A Lorenz curve is a curve formed by plotting
the cumulative distribution of the amount of a variable against the cumulative frequency
distribution of the individuals having the amount." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAl.
DICTIONARY 1337 (unabr. ed. 1971). The absurdity that can be reached by employing the estate
multiplier method in just that way is illustrated in the undertaking by the Inland Reserve,
Britain's Internal Revenue Service, for 1972-73. It was estimated that 51.3% and 67.2% of
personal wealth was owned by the top 1% and 10% of the population, respectively. The
problem with that estimate is that it assumed that over half the adult population owned no
wealth at all. The report observed, nevertheless, that while a serious shortage of reliable
information existed as to the distribution of wealth, the available data could provide a useful
basis for study of wealth distribution in Britain, subject to its being interpreted with extreme
care. Ilersic, Incomes and Wealth in the U.K., 24 CAN. TAX J. 258, 261-62 (1976). Tait,
recognizing at least some of the important deficiencies with the estate multiplier method,
maintains that the broad validity of the distribution estimates are not discredited as to alter
the distribution pattern. He even employs the statistics along a complete Lorenz curve. A.
TAIr, supra note 48, at 5-6.
55. U.K. Report of Commissioners of Inland Reserve for Year Ended 31 March 1964,
107th Report, Feb. 1965, H.M.S.O. Cmd. 2573, at 165, cited in A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 4.
56. Smith and Franklin acknowlege as much but call it "a totally atypical fluke." Smith
& Franklin, supra note 51, at 163 n.5.
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of assets actually owned, totals which do not reflect average prices,
property counted twice, failures to select suitable mortality rates,
and the necessity to infer the year of death.57 There are also techni-
cal problems which cause the figures to be underestimated.58 In
addition, the very definition of personal wealth is uncertain; appar-
ently only marketable assets are included in the computations.59
It should be pointed out that the data compiled according to
the estate multiplier method, with all its shortcomings in the aggre-
gate may provide quite reliable information about the distribution
of wealth in this or any other country. Given the possibility that it
may convey spurious results, however, one ought to use caution
before making drastic recommendations based on such data.
V. GENERAL PRINCIPLES: THE CONTROVERSY
A. Arguments for a Wealth Tax
Certain individuals believe that extraordinarily large concen-
trations of wealth in the hands of a relative handful of individuals
is out of keeping with modern societal notions of proper wealth
distribution.0 Others consider the perpetual existence of huge pri-
vate fortunes, with their concomitant plutocratic control of eco-
nomic power, as a threat to the very continuation of democratic
government." Generally speaking, the principal justification ad-
duced for any wealth tax-whether its primary objective is to break
up or check the growth of large concentrations of wealth, or to serve
as an alternative to higher progression of a currently progressive
57. Smith & Calvert, supra note 49, at 248-49, 253; A. TArr, supra note 48, at 5.
58. Smith & Calvert, supra note 49, at 248-49.
59. Smith & Franklin, supra note 51, at 166-67. In listing those things includible in their
calculations, neither mention nor suggest that public and private employee pension rights
were includible in the gross assets of the employees. Interestingly, a similar determination
was made in the British study, namely, to exclude private occupational and state pension
rights. Ilersic, supra note 54, at 262. Ilersic points out that when both occupational and state
pension rights are included, the share of the bottom 80% of the population rises from 19.2%
to 40.7%-a significant difference.
60. Ilersic, Wealth Taxation in the U.K., 22 CAN. TAX J. 530.36 (1974).
61. Control over the [Japanese] economy is more nearly related to the own-
ership of wealth than to the receipt of income. Indeed, even very large incomes
received as salary, or as royalties for a popular novel, or the like, do not represent
the same danger to the preservation of democracy as would a comparable income
derived from securities or other property. . . . [Tihe accumulation of huge for-
tunes that threatens to concentrate the control of the economic system in the
hands of a few wealthy individuals . . . is a danger of particular significance to
Japan.
U.S. TAX MISSION TO JAPAN. Report on Japanese Taxation by the Shoup Mission, GENERAL
HEADQUARTERS, SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS, 83 (1949), cited in Tanabe,
supra note 3, at 129 n.14.
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income tax structure62-is that wealth yields benefits above and
beyond the income derived from it. It thus confers upon its possessor
additional taxable capacity which equity requires to be taken into
account. 3 The classic case used to illustrate the proposition is the
contrast between the opulent rajah, whose wealth consists entirely
of $10,000,000 worth of gold and jewels, and the beggar who pos-
sesses neither income nor property. Comparing the two on the basis
of income alone, neither has any taxable capacity. But when we take
into account the rajah's ability to convert a portion of his assets for
current consumption, clearly he is better off than the beggar. 4 Even
looking at individuals whose income-wealth comparison is far less
severe, the fundamental situation remains the same. Thus, two per-
sons with families of equal size, each with $10,000 annual income,
are not equal in taxable capacity where one has over $1,000,000 in
the bank while the other only $10,000. The former clearly has
greater economic security as well as a greater ability to meet unfa-
vorable contingencies. He can spend beyond his current income
even to some point of extravagance, knowing that he has considera-
ble sums on which he can rely. A certain feeling of esteem is also
gained from the mere possession of such wealth. Thus the basic
62. Practical considerations may impose limits on the degree of progression
obtainable with income, spendings, and succession taxes alone. If still steeper
progression is desired, a tax on net wealth may provide a possible method of
topping off the tax structure. Such a net wealth tax would not be considered an
important element in the revenue system, but rather a means of achieving a
redistribution of wealth at the top of the scale more rapidly than is possible with
the other taxes alone. . . . Such a net worth tax would be an acceptable substi-
tute for the continuation of the graduation in the upper ranges of income, spend-
ings, or succession taxes.
VICKERY, AGENDA FOR PROGREssIvE TAXATION 362-63 (1947).
63. C. SANDFORD, TAXING PERSONAL WEALTH 24 (1971); Tanabe, supra note 3, at 130.
Denis Healey, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, made the point as follows in the foreword
to the Green Paper:
One of the main purposes of personal direct taxation is to share out the burden
of taxation fairly in accordance with the ability to pay. In this country we have
come to think of income as the main yardstick of taxable capacity and have
sought to promote a greater equality through a progressive income tax. However,
income by itself is not an adequate measure of taxable capacity. The ownership
of wealth, whether it produces income or not, adds to the economic resources of a
taxpayer so that the person who has wealth as well as income of a given size
necessarily has a greater taxable capacity than the one who has only income.
Because our present tax system takes no account of this fact, although we have a
highly progressive system of income tax, the bulk of privately owned wealth is still
concentrated in relatively few hands. Once the additional taxable capacity repre-
sented by ownership of wealth is adequately brought into charge, excessive in-
equalities of wealth will in time be eroded, and it will be possible to reduce the
high rates of tax on earned income.
Wealth Tax, supra note 5, at iii.
64. N. KALDOR, INDIAN TAX REFORM 20 (1956).
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inadequacy of progressive income taxation as the near exclusive
source of revenue is that it protects rather than redistributes wealth.
It becomes a tax on becoming wealthy, providing those who are
already wealthy with protection from the competition of those who
would share the wealth with them.6" In any event, it is generally
conceded that such an argument for redistributing wealth rests pri-
marily on moral rather than on economic grounds."
Another argument in favor of a wealth tax is that it would
contribute to a more productive use of capital insofar as the tax
would be levied irrespective of yield. 7 This should promote the
movement of capital out of non-income producing assets such as
cash, precious metals, jewels, and uncultivated land, as well as low
income producing ones such as certain bonds and securities. As a
consequence, capital would be infused into higher yield invest-
ments. Thus, in reducing security and liquidity preferences, greater
risk-taking and a more efficient use of productive resources is en-
couraged."6
A final argument advanced for net worth taxation is that it
promotes a greater efficiency of income tax administration. This is
done by providing information on capital values which can be used
to cross-check the accuracy of income tax returns, thus discouraging
concealment of the income from invested wealth because of the
greater likelihood of detection."
B. Arguments Against a Wealth Tax
While it is suggested by some that the general arguments
against a wealth tax are reducible to concerns about practical diffi-
culties in administering the tax and the possible adverse economic
consequences, particularly on saving, 0 the arguments are in fact
65. M. FRIEDMAN, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH 22 (1975); Due, Net Worth
Taxation, 15 PUBLIC FINANCE 315 (1960).
66. C. SANDFORD, supra note 63, at 24; A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 21.
67. C. SANDFORD, supra note 63, at 12.
68. Due, supra note 65, at 318. Professor Due also claims that a wealth tax,
while not taxing increases in capital values, as such, does reach the higher values
as they accrue. By contrast, the income tax, in practice, never reaches them until
they are realized-and thus gives an incentive to avoid realization (the locked-in
effect). Even when realized, the gains are taxed very inadequately, under the
income tax laws of many countries.
Id. at 316. This argument may not be a very strong one insofar as a wealth tax is not an
adequate substitute for a capital gains tax. C. SANDFORD, R. WILS & D. IRONSIDE, AN ANNUAL
WEALTH TAX (1975) [hereinafter cited as SA.DFORD].
69. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 132-33.
70. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 12; Thurow, Net Worth Taxes, 25 NAT'L TAX J. 417, 421-
23 (1972).
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more numerous. In a subjective sense, it is impossible to be sure if
individuals are equally wealthy since personal satisfaction cannot
be measured directly.7 Materialistic wealth has always been an
extremely incomplete index of taxable capacity, since it does not
consider the human resources of individuals who depend on earn-
ings from personal services.72 A wealth tax concerns itself only with
the status quo and not how the situation arose in the first place,
suggesting that if all wealth were taxed as it was transferred into
new ownership, the claim that wealth represented additional taxa-
ble capacity would no longer stand. Indeed, this argument points
in the direction of an integrated estate, gift, and income tax system,
rather than the introduction of a wealth tax as a check on concentra-
tions of wealth.74
There is no definition of what constitutes an unacceptable
wealth distribution. Wherever there is a relatively high exemption
limiting the application of a wealth tax,75 it is indicative only of the
point at which wealth accumulation may be considered unaccepta-
ble. But to tax wealth only when it reaches a certain level proves
that it is not aimed at ownership of wealth per se, but only at
excessive inequalities of wealth. This would tend to weaken the
equity argument of additional taxable capacity unless it too was
intended to apply only to excessive concentrations of wealth.76
Redistribution of wealth can take two forms: it can flow from
one individual to other individuals or from an individual to the
state. The static nature of a wealth tax demonstrates that it can
achieve only the latter since it operates only when the unacceptable
level of wealth has been reached. Thus, it merely serves to confiscate
accumulations above that level.77 For there to be a significant redis-
tribution to the state, a confiscating marginal rate approaching one
71. Macdonald, The Wealth Tax-The Wrong Tool for the Job, 1975 BRIT. TAX REV. 287.
72. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 21; Tanabe, supra note 3, at 146-47. Regarding the
suggestion that human capital be included in the base of a wealth tax, Goode denies the
validity of any such consideration, arguing that the capital value of personal earnings is not
wealth. R. GooDE, supra note 2, at 21. The reasons are that the right to receive all such income
cannot be bought and sold, long-term labor contracts are usually barred, and short-term
contracts cannot be freely transferred.
73. Macdonald, supra note 71, at 286.
74. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 31. See also M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 168-
76 (1962).
75. Clark's exemption limit, as noted infra, would exclude the first one million from
wealth tax assessment. The comparable British figure has been put at £100,000, though that
figure is assumed for illustrative purposes. Wealth Tax, supra note 5, at 3. See Tanabe, supra
note 3, at 137-38, for a comparison of the exemption limits in the fourteen countries in his
study.
76. Macdonald, supra note 71, at 283.
77. Id. at 284.
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hundred percent is required, a rate which clearly would be unac-
ceptable.78 The argument that great concentrations of wealth bring
power to those who possess them might suggest that the power be
controlled, not necessarily that the wealth itself should be confis-
cated or broken up.7"
It has been said that those who decry inequalities in wealth
distribution often advance such criticism only to hide their basic
envy and political discontent. 0 Discrimination of this sort against
a wealthy minority of a population without any criteria for limiting
the extent of such discrimination is incompatible with the governing
principles of democracy and the rule of law. A majority of persons
should not be able to decide the appropriate limit on another citi-
zen's wealth. The consumption of the wealthy, however extravagant
or wasteful, is always conspicuous, but even conspicuous waste
must be countenanced as the price of freedom. A world in which a
majority could prevent all that it did not like would probably be a
stagnant and a declining world.'
Those who seek to justify the wealth tax on equitable grounds
fail to consider the significance of the fact that income from differ-
ent kinds of property of the same value can still differ greatly. Taxes
levied on the basis of property values discriminate against those
whose income yield on investments is negligible. The lead time for
enterprises to become productive can be lengthy, causing an indi-
vidual who holds shares in such an investment to pay a tax based
on the market value of his shares, notwithstanding that no divi-
dends may be payable for years. He is thus forced to consume his
capital to meet his tax liability."
78. Id. at 283-84. See also Stem, The Needle's Eye of a Socialist Heaven, Bow GROUP
MEMORANDUM (1974); Thurow, supra note 70, at 420-22.
79. Macdonald, supra note 71, at 287.
80. Ilersic, supra note 60, at 530.
81. See F. HAYEK, THE CONsTrrUION OF LIBERTY 124-30, 306-23 (1960).
82. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 145. Lester Thurow is quite sanguine about the idea of
forcing some individuals to sell assets in order to pay for the wealth tax. He believes wealthy
individuals will figure out how to maintain the necessary degree of liquidity in their portfolios.
In any event, generous spreading provisions should eliminate or at least reduce this particular
problem. But he concludes:
There is no doubt that some individuals would be forced to sell assets. This is
precisely what a wealth tax is all about. Wealth taxes are designed to control the
distribution of wealth. They are not designed to allow every individual to keep
that degree of wealth that he would like.
Thurow, supra note 70, at 421. It was pointed out that the taxing of wealth holders with little
money income (recall Kaldor's rajah) was one of the reasons leading to the abolition of the
net wealth tax in Japan. It seems that forests represented one of the principal sources of
wealth in 1950. With little or no current income the owners were being forced to sell the forest
land to pay the tax. But the conservation of forests was considered one of the chief instru-
ments for improving the war-ravaged economy. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 144-46.
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VI. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS ATTENDANT TO A WEALTH TAX
A. Introduction
A wealth tax bears great similarity to that form of general prop-
erty taxation which has existed at one time or another in every
nation, including our own, since ancient times.13 A property tax
differs from a wealth tax insofar as property taxes are generally
imposed on the gross value of the property, primarily real property,
while a wealth tax takes into account the outstanding liabilities of
the taxpayer so as to arrive at a net figure. Thus, the wealth tax is
levied on the particular person involved, but the property tax is
levied on the property itself.84
Having examined the general property tax in its historical, the-
oretical and practical aspects, Seligman concluded:
The general property tax as actually administered is beyond all
doubt one of the worst taxes known in the civilized world. Be-
cause of its attempt to tax intangible as well as tangible things,
it sins against the cardinal rules of uniformity, of equality and of
universality of taxation. It puts a premium on dishonesty and
debauches the public conscience; it reduces deception to a sys-
tem, and makes a science of knavery; it presses hardest on those
least able to pay it; it imposes double taxation on one man and
grants entire immunity to the next. In short, the general property
tax is so flagrantly inequitable, that its retention can be ex-
plained only through ignorance or inertia. It is the cause of such
crying injustice that its alteration or its abolition must become
the battle cry of every statesman and reformer. 5
Most experts still criticise property taxation, particularly with
regard to its assessment." The principal difficulty inherent in prop-
erty tax administration lies in the absence of a market transaction:
without a sale, assessments must be based on fallible human judg-
ment.8? Property taxation is undoubtedly made easier whenever the
number of appraisal tasks are kept to a minimum. Even then, de-
spite notable improvements in property tax administration in some
areas, discrimination and inequity remain. 8 Insofar as the wealth
tax would be administered on the federal level without the luxury
of a narrow property tax base, assessment difficulties are almost
certain to become more acute.
83. See E. SEUGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 32-37 (10th ed. 1931).
84. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 125.
85. E. SEUGMAN, supra note 83, at 62.
86. G. BENSON, S. BENSON, H. MCCLELLAND & P. THOMSON, THE AMERICAN PROPERTY TAX:
ITS HISTORY, ADMINISTRATION AND ECONOMIC IMPACT 84-86 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
BENSON].
87. Id. at 87.
88. Id. at 87-100.
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B. Threshold Level and Assessment Costs
The administratively desirable threshold liability level for in-
cidence of a wealth tax depends to a great extent on the purpose of
such a tax.89 Where, as under the Clark proposal, the purpose is both
to reduce undue concentrations of wealth and to provide tax relief
to lower and middle income groups, a high threshold such as the
proposed one million dollar figure is justified." A high threshold has
the added benefit of reducing the number of individuals liable to the
tax. This latter point is no small matter. To have audited net worth
returns from only the top .5% of the population in 1970 would have
required over 1,000,000 such audits, at a time when the number of
millionaires was estimated at 148,000.1 Assuming that the net value
89. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 137-38.
90. It has been pointed out that the American experience with the general property tax,
a limited form of wealth taxation, has revealed great difficulties in the discovery and valua-
tion of intangibles and household property. Even while conceding that the federal government
might be more adept than local assessors and that the linkup between wealth and income
tax levies might be potentially advantageous, the idea of a wealth tax with low exemptions
and broad coverage seems unrealistic. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 31. Mindful of similar
difficulties, the British are contemplating a £100,000 exemption from their wealth tax.
Wealth Tax, supra note 5, at 3.
91. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 268 (citing INTERNAL REvENuE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1969, PERSONAL WEALTH 54 (1973)). The number of individuals with a gross estate
in excess of $1,000,000 is not strictly comparable to those whose net worth exceeds $1,000,000.
The latter figure for 1969 would be only $121,000. Id. at 268 n.41.
TABLE 1
1969
Value Held by Richest Share Held by Richest
Asset 100.0% 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1.0%
billions per cent
Real estate $1,188.8 $117.0 $170.7 9.8 14.4
Corporate stock 832.5 366.3 423.3 44.0 50.8
Bonds 198.9 63.7 71.5 32.0 35.9
Cash 495.0 48.1 71.2 9.7 14.4
Debt instruments 85.3 21.9 29.6 25.7 34.7
Life insurance (CSV) 127.2 8.4 13.8 6.6 10.8
Miscellaneous and trusts 705.8 107.0 133.2 15.2 18.9
Trusts 70.4 60.0 64.5 85.2 91.6
Miscellaneous 633.7 47.0 68.7 7.4 10.8
Total assets $3,561.4 $672.4 $848.8 18.9 23.8
Liabilities $ 557.5 $ 75.8 $100.5 13.6 18.0
Net worth $3,003.0 $596.7 $748.1 19.9 24.9
millions
Number of persons 1.01 2.03
Source: Smith & Franklin, The Concentration of Personal Wealth, 64 AMER. ECON. REV.
166 (1974).
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of all assets held by the aforementioned grouping has not signifi-
cantly increased," the elimination of some 850,000 individuals from
any filing requirement will have almost no effect on the overall
yield, but it would greatly facilitate the reasonable assessment of
the remaining returns where most of the total revenues would be
derived. Nevertheless, wealth tax assessments on only the estimated
175,000 millionaires would greatly increase the Internal Revenue
Service workload, 3 as well as increase the costs related to producing
those audits.4
Consistent with American practice regarding other tax assess-
ments, self-assessment undoubtedly would be followed. This is
probably necessary to prevent the collection of such a tax from
becoming an impossibly massive undertaking. 5 Additionally, since
a high exemption threshold is envisaged, wealth tax liability could
be handled on the basis of a single return for both income and
92. There are no available statistics.
93. The figures which roughly approximate the magnitude and scope of such a filing
requirement are those relating to the filing of estate tax returns. In 1973, 174,899 estate tax
returns, representing gross estates totaling thirty-eight billion dollars were filed. Assuming
net worth valuations for the 175,000 individuals who would be required to pay a wealth tax
are correct, they would represent some fifteen times the value of current annual estate tax
return valuations.
TABLE 2
ESTATE TAX RETURNS
Revenue Agents Tax Auditors
FY 1975 FY 1974 FY 1973 FY 1975 FY 1974 FY 1973
Total Examinations 9,995 8,876 6,857 3,118 2,594 1,980
Total Direct Examination
Time (Days) 14,195 12,367 11,309 2,344 2,265 1,974
Total Dollar Recommendations
(Mils) $64.4 $65.9 $77.7 $2.7 $2.9 $2.3
Average Hours Per Return 10.4 10.9 11.4 5.7 6.6 6.5
Average Dollar
Recommendations Per
Return $6,465 $7,424 $11,337 $ 860 $1,118 $1,163
No Change Percentage 30% 28% 28% 34% 31% 36%
Source: I.R.S. ANNUAL REPORT 116 (1975).
94. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 33 n.34 (citing INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF
INCOME-1970, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 91 (1974)).
95. See Ashton, Administrative Costs of the Proposed Wealth Tax-A Preliminary
Estimate, 1975 BRIT. TAX REV. 98. The British Green Paper also proposes a system of self-
assessment. Wealth Tax, supra note 5, at 61-65.
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wealth taxes. The assessment itself would require a detailed and
rather complicated form, however, the filling out of which would
constitute a hidden cost of the tax. 6
In addition to the administrative costs to the government and
to the taxpayer, any change in tax incidence which will increase the
burden on some while reducing it on others, bears close scrutiny
because it may bring enough resentment from the former to cause
them to act contrary to the design of such change. It may be argued
that a tax policy deliberately directed at the elimination of large
private fortunes will induce a significant number of hitherto law
abiding taxpayers to evade such levies or to act even more unpre-
dictably. 7 The underlying premise is that while the threat of detec-
tion is a factor inducing tax compliance, attitudes toward the tax
system-particularly concerning the equity or fairness of the sys-
tem-may be even more important." A significant number of
wealthy individuals may even decide to emigrate with their wealth
to countries more hospitable to the acquisition and accumulation of
large fortunes."
It has been suggested that the use of wealth tax values for the
purpose of other taxes offers important savings in administrative
and compliance costs through useful cross-checks. 0 This alone
would never justify the imposition of such a tax, however, particu-
96. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 252. It was estimated that the cost of taxpayer compli-
ance would be considerable when compared with the revenue generated by a wealth tax.
Wheatcroft, The Administrative Problems of a Wealth Tax, 1963 BRIT. TAX REV. 410, 413-
14. It was reported that there was "no serious concern" among the five continental European
countries which have a wealth tax. It was acknowledged, however, that in the Netherlands,
which most closely resembled a self-assessment, self-valuation system, the costs of compli-
ance were high. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 251.
97. Wheatcroft, supra note 96, at 421. In the first Pollock case, Justice Field, in his
concurring opinion, stated:
Whenever a distinction is made in the burdens a law imposes or in the benefits it
confers on any citizens by reason of their birth, or wealth, or religion, it is class
legislation, and leads inevitably to oppression and abuses, and to general unrest
and disturbance in society. . . . It is the same in essential character as that of
the English income statute of 1691, which taxed Protestants at a certain rate,
Catholics, as a class, at double the rate of Protestants, and Jews at another and
separate rate.
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 596 (1895) (Field, J., concurring).
98. Spicer, New Approaches to the Problem of Tax Evasion, 1975 BRIT. TAX REv. 152,
153. The author's sampling of Ohio households indicated a positive relationship between tax
evasion and the perceived inequity of the tax system. Thus he concluded that whenever
unfavorable attitudes toward the tax system exist, efforts should be made to isolate that part
of the tax system deemed peculiarly obnoxious and consideration should be given as to
whether the perceived benefits from that portion outweigh the potential costs to the system
due to noncompliance. Id. at 153-54.
99. Wheatcroft, supra note 97, at 421.
100. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 249-50.
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larly because a wealth tax would add complexity to our already
complex tax laws. Significant revisions would be necessary to ac-
commodate taxing the wealth held in trusts'0 ' and closely held cor-
porations.0 2 In addition, married couples affected by the tax would
likely seek to reduce their personal wealth through gift-splitting.
Therefore, consideration would have to be given to treating the fam-
ily as the taxable unit, rather than the individual. 3 The place of
children in the tax unit is even more difficult. 04 It may be difficult
to determine who owns the capital upon which the tax will be as-
sessed. 05 Finally, the administrative difficulties which make taxa-
tion of unrealized capital gains infeasible apply equally to a wealth
tax. 0 For these reasons, improving the existing income and transfer
taxes may be more prudent than introducing a wealth tax.'07
C. Discovery of Assets
In theory at least, it seems altogether sensible that if one were
to institute a wealth tax at all, its scope should be as comprehensive
as possible. In other words, the taxpayer should be taxed on the
total value of all his assets, wherever situated; 08 however, the
101. See A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 163-65; SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 189-97. See also
Ray, Wealth Tax-An Analysis of the Green Paper, 1974 NEW L.J. 876.
102. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 200-16.
103. The federal estate tax recognizes individual rather than family ownership of prop-
erty, although the 50% marital deduction represents a partial recognition of family ownership.
I.R.C. §§ 2001, 2056.
104. A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 161.
105. Id. at 155-57.
106. See R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 28 & n.7 (citing H. SIMONS, FEDERAL TAX REFORM
48, 74 (1950)).
107. Id. at 31.
108. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 115. See also Tanabe, supra note 3, at 136. A possible
modification of the cadastral method which might improve its effectiveness would be the
monitoring of annual valuation changes in the official or base values by employing a modified
version of a statistical model used in multiple linear regression analysis. In simplified terms,
the mathematical solution to the problem can be stated thus: our base year enables us to
assign an actually known value to an asset in that year. We know that the ultimate value of
the asset in any subsequent year depends upon many factors, or variables which are related
to it, but which do not interact with each other in their effects upon that ultimate value. What
we do not know is the combined effect of any number of independent variables on a dependent
one. This can be expressed by the formula Y' = a+ bX, +bX, + . . . +bnXn where Y'
represents the anticipated value of the asset, a represents the value of the asset in the base
year, X represents the values of the independent variables, and b represents the constant
weight assigned to each independent variable. The method by which the constants and the
variables are calculated is well beyond the scope of this paper. Let it suffice, however, that
the aforementioned equation will best approximate the value of any asset by finding the value
which deviated the least from among all possible values for that asset, given the number of
independent variables employed that would effect it. Remaining would be a line which cannot
be represented in geometrical form because the coordinate points require as many dimensions
as there are independent variables; a computer, therefore, would be needed to find the line.
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broader the coverage the more difficult it would be to prevent eva-
sion by under-reporting. Assets like cash, gold, art, jewelry and
some intangibles which are generally in unregistered form are ex-
tremely difficult to discover. 09 This problem could be alleviated by
exempting from the wealth tax all household and personal effects,
jewelry, works of art, and collections."" Of course, this would en-
courage avoidance of the tax. It would also destroy the rationale that
the tax encouraged investment. Even without such an exemption,
a wealth tax necessarily discriminates against real property owners
whose net wealth is easily identified in favor of those whose wealth
is unable to be traced.'
It has been suggested that this problem is not insurmountable,
provided that the government has access to all insurance records of
individuals who would normally insure their valuables." 2 Notwith-
standing the administrative nightmare caused by monitoring insur-
ance p6licies, tax avoiders would respond to this policing method by
simply not buying insurance. It is likely that no effective wealth tax
could be administered without the adoption of a far more circum-
scribed system of property registration and property transfer, pros-
pects which many would find unsettling."3
Wherever the line is ultimately located, some values will obviously be above the line,
others below it. This means, in practical terms, that certain taxpayers will find their assets
undervalued while the assets of others will be overvalued. It can therefore be anticipated that
unless this method of valuation is immune from attack (an extremely doubtful assumption,
given that this very method of valuation, in its self-conscious integrity, must admit that it
arbitrarily assigns no importance whatsoever to the actual value of any particular asset),
those adversely affected will challenge its employment. This will mean a revenue loss from
those underassessed and reduced revenue from those overassessed, reflected in the cost of the
latter's obtaining due process.
Another difficulty with this approach, aside from its costs, is that the validity of our
findings depend critically on the validity of our assumptions. For each asset, variables must
be assigned. The more time and money put into the project, the more reliable the final result
will be. There will always be some factor which may influence the value of any asset which
cannot be accounted for. Now, of course, the validity of our assumptions could be verified
directly by obtaining information from everyone in the population; if that were done, how-
ever, there would be no need for employing a statistical method of approximation in the first
place. For a more thorough discussion of the utility of multiple regression analysis, see J. HEY,
STATISTICS IN ECONOMICS 299-347 (1974); D. PALUMBO, STATISTICS IN POLITICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
SCIENCE 208-16 (1969).
109. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 275; Due, supra note 65, at 320. It is Professor Due's
contention, however, that "[w]ith a nationally administered tax, [underreporting] would
not be as serious as it might appear, since cross-checking between income and wealth tax
returns would reveal many omissions." Due, supra note 65, at 320. This assumes that there
will be something with which to cross-check; individuals who desire to conceal income from
property will not be peculiarly motivated to report the property itself.
110. See, SANDFORD, supra note 68, app. C, at 308.
111. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 144. In 1969, as Table 1 shows (supra note 91), about 10%
of all wealth held by the top .5% was held in real estate.
112. Thurow, supra note 70, at 423.
113. See generally Tanabe, supra note 3, at 151.
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D. Valuation of Assets
As previously mentioned, any tax which attempts to take into
account all accrued but unrealized changes in the value of assets
and liabilities might not be desirable even if it were feasible. The
argument against its feasibility has been stated as follows:
To take account of unrealized gains and losses would require the
detailed listing of taxpayers' assets and liabilities and annual
valuations. The lists would be long, and for many items market
quotations would not be readily available. Considerable difficulty
is encountered in valuing certain securities and many business
properties for purposes of the estate tax, even though these valua-
tions need to be made only once for each of a relatively small
number of taxpayers. Most experts agree that annual appraisals
would not be feasible under the income tax. Even if valuations
were made somewhat less frequently, the accrual treatment
seems impractical despite some offsetting gains in the form of
simplification or elimination of certain complex features of the
present income tax."4
An annual wealth tax would compound the aforementioned difficul-
ties insofar as it contemplates an assessed valuation for all assets
on an annual basis, not merely those upon which gain has accrued.
This means ascertaining representative market values for all forms
of property. It has been pointed out that the task is not difficult
wherever there is a large and continuous market in the rights or
commodities involved, as there are in most stocks and bonds.
Where, however, there are few or no market transactions the valua-
tion problem is particularly acute." 5 Furthermore, nonliquid
assets such as partnerships, farms, buildings, real estate, oil wells
and other mineral rights, and closely held business enterprises
also present valuation problems."'
"Fair market value" has been defined as "that amount which
one ready and willing but not compelled to buy would pay to an-
other ready and willing but not compelled to sell the property.""' 7
The application of this principle for wealth tax purposes is desirable
because any higher value might be regarded as unfair while any
114. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 28. For a contrary view, see Thurow, supra note 70, at
421. Thurow declares that the administrative difficulties of wealth tax are illusory and that
tax lawyers and tax economists are to blame for having scared away the public.
115. A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 157. Tait points out that even where a large market exists
for something, valuation can be troublesome whenever the asset being valued is large. Any
attempt to sell such asset could severely depress the market price for the marginal unit and
this might require a sale over a prolonged period of time.
116. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 152.
117. Treas. Reg. § 301.6325-1(b) (1976).
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lower value might create a "locked-in" effect. Even where the fair
market value of property is easily ascertained, there may be a big
difference between the price at which a taxpayer can purchase an
asset and that at which he can sell the very same asset."' Thus a
value for wealth tax purposes, if it is set at the upper range of what
the asset would cost, could be unfair.
A number of solutions have been proposed to handle valuation
problems. Lord Kaldor, in his report on India, proposed that prop-
erty be valued initially when the tax is introduced (forming the cost
at which it is entered into the accounting books) and subsequently
when the property is transferred to a different owner otherwise than
by sale."9 The approach has been criticized because the wealth tax
would lose much of its appeal as an added measure of taxable capac-
ity:
Failure to take account of unrealized appreciation or decreases in
the value of assets would be a more serious defect in a wealth tax
than in an income tax. Any particular gain or loss affects wealth
in all subsequent years but affects income of only one year; conse-
quently later actual or constructive realization will do more to
make up for the earlier omission of accrued gains and losses under
the income tax than under the wealth tax. A wealth tax on book
value, like a tax on realized income, imposes an additional liabil-
ity when appreciated assets are sold and hence may deter eco-
nomically desirable switches of investment.20
The method proposed by Professor Sandford is for the establish-
ment of cadastral or official values to be placed on all assets without
readily ascertainable market values, to be revised approximately
every five years, thus minimizing administrative costs and avoiding
uncertainty and delay. 2' The major difficulty with this, however, is
that such values, notwithstanding inflation, will generally lag be-
hind current ones, and the taxes paid thereupon will be based on
inadequate values.'22 Another possible solution is self-valuation
of assets by the owners, subject to government challenge within a
statutorily limited amount of time. This approach is most consis-
tent with our general treatment of tax matters and might be
118. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 160. An example offered is of a consumers' organization
which bought a diamond for £2595, but was able to get only two offers for it one week later
-one for £550 and another for £1000. Id.
119. N. KALDOR, supra note 64, at 25.
120. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 31.
121. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 161-67.
122. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 32.
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adopted despite the implicit uncertainties. Without an effective en-
forcing device, however, this approach also has its defects.'23
Whichever method is chosen, there is a real danger that certain
wealth holders will be forced to sell their assets to pay the tax.
Clearly, it would be undesirable to compel farmers, whose agricul-
tural land has been rising steadily in price, to liquidate in whole or
in part their principal asset in order to satisfy the tax.'24 This prob-
lem would be felt similarly in a business where a sole proprietor
places a substantial portion of his assets as well as accumulated
profits into the venture, only to be confronted with the wealth tax
assessment. 5
Assuming that a satisfactorily workable valuation for all assets
could be found, any wealth tax proposal would have to solve the
problem caused by the selection of an assessment date.'26 An arbi-
trary assessment date necessarily distorts the actual net worth of
each individual assessed, benefitting some, injuring others. Some
averaging scheme might be possible to rectify this, but again not
without considerable compliance and administrative costs.'27 Bank
balances would be an example of property so affected. 28 Therefore,
although the idea of a limited annual wealth tax may be administra-
tively feasible, it will nevertheless cause hardships which may out-
weigh the benefits. 2 '
VII. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF A WEALTH TAX
The practical effects of a wealth tax on economic behavior are
unpredictable because they generally encompass but a small part
of the economy as a whole and because economic behavior is influ-
enced by many more considerations than a particular form of taxa-
tion. 3 " Numerous economic benefits are claimed for the net wealth
tax relative to its effects upon investment and economic develop-
ment generally. 3' An important asserted benefit is that since the tax
will not impinge upon the incremental gain from investment or
expansion but rather upon the total accumulation of an individual,
there should be a disincentive to avoid earning income; that is, past
123. See generally id. at 153.
124. See generally SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 217-31.
125. Id. at 199-216.
126. Due, supra note 65, at 320.
127. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 32.
128. Due, supra note 65, at 320.
129. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 31-32.
130. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 147; A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 183-90.
131. Due, supra note 65, at 317-19.
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and future effort will be taxed regardless of yield, so the assets might
as well be directed towards meeting the tax payments. In addition,
as mentioned earlier, there may be a tendency to push investments
out of cash, gold, and low income securities and into higher-yield
investments, presumably contributing to economic growth and effi-
ciency. 32 No economic benefits, however, are seriously asserted for
a wealth tax when the combination of wealth and income tax levies
approaches or exceeds 100% of net income.'33 The Clark proposal
contemplates a tax on 3% of net worth, which would bie the equiva-
lent of a 60% tax on income derived from net wealth on which the
yield is 5%.134 Depending on an individual's tax bracket, the yield
on his assets, and the source of that yield, the prospect of certain
individuals being unable to meet reasonable consumption require-
ments from disposable net income becomes very real. This would
not be as serious if the tax were designed to reduce higher marginal
rates of taxation on both income and investments. Advocates of
such an additive wealth tax, however, are usually contemptuous of
any tax provision aimed at reducing high marginal rates and would
rather see them made more effective.'35 There is scant empirical
evidence to support the proposition that any particular combined
rate of income and wealth tax will have any adverse effect on work
effort, incentives to produce, and savings. It is expected, neverthe-
less, that rates above a 70% level will seriously diminish the forego-
ing endeavors. 3 A study in India was made to analyze the impact
of a similar wealth tax which, when combined with the income tax,
took between 90% and 120% of net income on savings and invest-
ment. The study was done by comparing aggregate savings and
investments seven years before and seven years after the tax was
introduced.'37 The conclusion was that capital formation in the na-
132. Id. at 317. This argument is questionable since it assumes that efficiency is coexten-
sive with high yield and that resources are infinitely mobile. There are circumstances where
a low yield demonstrates neither the inefficiency of the producer nor the desirability that the
particular resources be taken away in the national interest. New ventures often have good
future prospects without having attained profitability, for example, farm yields can suddenly
plummet notwithstanding a rise in the value of agricultural land. SANDFORD, supra note 68,
at 12.
133. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 279-83.
134. See Tanabe, supra note 3, at 140.
135. See SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 277. Thus the Clark proposal calls for, inter alia,
the abandonment of the maximum tax on earned income in I.R.C. § 1348. It is instructive to
note that no European country which has a wealth tax employs it to reduce wealth inequali-
ties. There is, therefore, no directly comparable experience anywhere. SANDFORD, supra note
68, at 278. See also id. at app. 3, 302-19, for a tabular summary of some European wealth
taxes.
136. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 274-78.
137. M. GOPAL, WEALTH TAX IN INDIA (1970). When the wealth tax was first introduced
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tional aggregate had not been affected in any appreciable degree nor
had it substantially reduced private savings in the community.'38 It
was conceded, however, that the wealth tax had had a considerable
effect on capital formation-there existed unaccounted for money,
income and wealth which had escaped assessment. Tax evasion in
India was found to be widespread and growing rapidly, concentrated
mainly in the higher income groups comprising the wealth tax asses-
sees. The data collected about the amounts that had been concealed
tended to suggest that overall tax evagion had had a considerable
effect on reducing otherwise productive utilizations of capital. The
efficiency of the wealth tax in this instance was severely criticized,
even to the point of encouraging its abolition.' 9
Whether or not there are investment incentives caused by the
introduction of a wealth tax, even when it is substituted for a higher
rate of income tax of equal yield, is a highly complex and debatable
question."" "A wealth tax would allow losses to be offset against
taxable wealth up to the full extent of the investor's net worth."' 4'
Such a set-off would seem to encourage investment enterprise. On
the other hand, the ultimate effect of a capital levy depends so
heavily on such matters as the use to which the levy is put, the
unexpectedness of the levy, the likelihood of repetition, and infla-
tion, that prediction is difficult."' It is safe to say only that any
reward resulting from risk-taking will increase wealth tax liability
only in the event that it is added to net worth."3
The effect of a wealth tax on savings appears to be much easier
to assess because the tax falls directly on all accumulations as
such.' The opportunity to add to future consumption through sav-
ing would seem to be restricted among the affected taxpayers,"
45
in 1957-58, the rates of wealth tax ranged from .5% on wealth of 2 Rs. lakh (1 lakh is 100,000
rupees) up to 1.5% on wealth in excess of 22 Rs. lakh. But since that time it has increased
five times while the exemption limit has been halved. SANDFORD, supra note 68, at 262-63.
138. M. GOPAL, supra note 137, at 86.
139. Id. at 78-87. One possible criticism of attempting to analyze possible or probable
occurrences in the United States upon the adoption of a tax policy similar to that in India,
is that attitudes about tai evasion are perhaps different. "While in the Western countries
evasion is regarded as a social crime by society, in India it is regarded as a feat of intelligence
and cleverness evoking admiration." Id. at 78 n.3 (quoting M. TAGI, REPORT OF THE WORKING
GROUP ON CENTRAL DIREcT TAX ADMINISTRATION 204 (1968)).
140. Compare R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 45-50 with A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 183-90.
141. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 48.
142. A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 188. It has been suggested that since a net worth tax
applies only to investment in nonhuman capital, individuals would have a significant incen-
tive to invest more of their capital in education. Due, supra note 65, at 319.
143. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 147; see R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 46.
144. R. GOODE, supra note 2, at 40.
145. Id.
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with no likelihood that the incidence of the tax can be shifted.' On
the other hand, it has been found that large wealth tends to be
associated with individuals whose marginal propensity to save is
very high and who would be likely to save any increment in income
or assets if they were able to do so.' Additionally, the psychological
effect of a wealth tax spread over the entire amount rather than an
income tax concentrated on the fruits of additional savings may not
prove negative after all.' Whether or not a potential decline in
aggregate saving would condemn a wealth tax depends to a great
extent on government savings and prevailing employment condi-
tions. '4 Thus, this question too remains unanswered.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Individuals who advocate a redistribution of wealth in America
often are so irresistibly drawn to any proposal which has as its
purpose the economic leveling of the wealthiest group of individuals,
that they are either unmindful or unconcerned about the inherent
problems which will ensue. The wealth tax proposal of Ramsey
Clark is no different. It assumes a perfectly designed tax as well as
an effectively administered one. It foresees nothing but perfect ac-
quiescence by those affected by the wealth tax. It supposes that the
tax can be instituted with modest costs. It dismisses any notion that
such a tax could have economically adverse consequences. None of
these notions is beyond serious challenge.
Any attempt to levy a federal tax on property solely by reason
of its ownership is probably unconstitutional, unless it is done in
such a way as to emasculate its very purpose. The suggestion that
the constitutional impediment no longer has any validity because
of the erroneous historical judgments upon which it is based should
be given little weight since subsequent Supreme Court decisions
have consistently applied the earlier understanding.
The judgments often made about the supposed distribution of
net worth in America are based upon a statistical model, the useful-
ness of which depends upon its ability to deduce wealth strata from
estate tax returns. This may or may not be an accurate way to
ascertain such information and caution should therefore be applied
in using it.
The principal justification for a wealth tax is that individuals
with enormous economic resources are not being taxed according to
146. But see Due, supra note 65, at 313.
147. Morgan, The Motivation of Savers, SAVINGS IN THE MODERN ECONOMY 214 (1953).
148. Tanabe, supra note 3, at 149.
149. A. TAIT, supra note 48, at 193.
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their ability to pay because income alone should not be the only
index of taxable capacity. In addition, wealth tax advocates point
to the likelihood of increased economic productivity caused by pen-
alizing inefficient uses of capital. There are also benefits to be
gained in income tax administration by providing cross-checks be-
tween income and the property which produced it.
Opponents of a wealth tax argue that those who favor it are
really insincere. If they really meant what they said, they would be
proposing rates which would make it absolutely impossible for the
tax to be met out of income; however, to do so would reveal much
of the envy and class animosity which actually motivate them. Any
degree of redistribution contemplated by a wealth tax could be ac-
complished much more easily and less costly with some modifica-
tions of our present estate, gift, and income tax structure. There is
no justification for making our tax laws any more complex than they
are already. A wealth tax would pose a serious problem for individu-
als whose yield on their assets is low, whether it is the result of
hoarding or the result of the particular enterprises in which they are
involved. It is inconsistent with democratic principles to discrimi-
nate without any limitation against a wealthy minority. A majority
of citizens should not be able to legislate the amount of wealth
allowed to be held by others.
Even assuming some self-assessment mechanism for a wealth
tax, the administrative costs to the Internal Revenue Service and
the compliance costs to the taxpayer would be significant. There is
a strong possibility that the imposition of such a tax would invite
tax evasion. In any event, it will be difficult to discover certain
assets, thus reducing the tax base and discriminating against those
with more visible assets. The considerations which make it difficult
to value accrued but unrealized gains will be made even more diffi-
cult with a wealth tax which attempts to value all assets, regardless
of gain or loss. The fair market value of any particular asset will not
be as easy to assess as wealth tax proponents might assume, particu-
larly when the assets involved are not readily bought and sold. The
timing of the assessment of the wealth tax is so crucial to the
amount of cumulative liability that without a reasonable solution
the expected yield from the tax may be greatly distorted.
The effect of a wealth tax on savings, investments, and risk-
taking is difficult to gauge, unpredictable, and dependent upon too
many imponderables. It is unlikely, however, that a wealth tax such
as the Clark proposal which causes the combined cumulative liabil-
ity from income and wealth taxes to exceed 70% of net income can
fail to affect adversely these economic concerns.
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